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The UK’s 30 year experiment in innovation policy is
crumbling: Universities can no longer be responsible for all of
society’s R&D
The UK fares very well in international comparisons of the research and development intensity
of the higher education sector, with 26 per cent of this research taking place in universities.
However, Richard Jones fears that universities soon won’t be able to meet the expectations
being placed on them and the country risks condemning itself to a low innovation, low growth
economy.
In 1981 the UK was one of  the world’s most research and development intensive economies,
with large scale R&D ef f orts being carried out in government and corporate laboratories in
many sectors. Over the thirty years between then and now, this situation has dramatically changed. A graph
of  the R&D intensity of  the national economy, measured as the f raction of  GDP spent on research and
development, shows a long decline through the 1980′s and 1990′s, with some levelling of f  f rom 2000 or so.
During this period the R&D intensity of  other advanced economies, like Japan, Germany, the USA and
France, has increased, while in f ast developing countries like South Korea and China the growth in R&D
intensity has been dramatic. The changes in the UK were in part driven by deliberate government policy, and
in part have been the side-ef f ects of  the particular model of  capitalism that the UK has adopted. Thirty
years on, we should be asking what the ef f ects of  this have been on our wider economy, and what we
should do about it.
The second graph breaks down where R&D takes place. The largest f ractional f all has been in research in
government establishments, which has dropped by more than 60 per cent. The largest part of  this f all took
place in the early part of  the period, under a series of  Conservative governments. This ref lects a general
drive towards a smaller state, a run-down of  def ence research, and the privatisation of  major, previously
research intensive sectors such as energy. However, it is clear that privatisation didn’t lead to a transf er of
the associated R&D to the business sector. It is in the business sector that the largest absolute drop in
R&D intensity has taken place – f rom 1.48 per cent of  GDP to 1.08 per cent. Cutting government R&D didn’t
lead to increases in private sector R&D, contrary to the expectations of  f ree marketeers who think the
state “crowds out” private spending.
Instead the business climate of  the time, with a drive to unlock “shareholder value” in the short- term,
squeezed out longer term investments in R&D. Some seek to explain this drop in R&D intensity in terms of
a change in the sectoral balance of  the UK economy, away f rom manuf acturing and towards f inancial
services, and this is clearly part of  the picture. However, I wonder whether this should be thought of  not so
much as an explanation, but more as a symptom. I’ve discussed in an earlier post the suggestion that “bad
capitalism” – f or example, speculations in f inancial and property markets, with the downside risk being
shouldered by the tax-payer – squeezes out genuine innovation.
The Labour government that came to power in 1997 did worry about the declining R&D intensity of  the UK
economy, and, in its Science Investment Framework 2004-2014 (PDF), set about trying to reverse the trend.
This long-term policy set a target of  reaching an overall R&D intensity of  2.5 per cent by 2014, and an
increase in R&D intensity in the business sector f rom to 1.7 per cent. The mechanisms put in place to
achieve this included a period of  real- terms increase in R&D spending by government, some tax incentives
f or business R&D, and a new agency f or nearer term research in collaboration with business, the
Technology Strategy Board. In the event, the increases in government spending on R&D did lead to some
increase in the UK’s overall research intensity, but the hoped-f or increase in business R&D simply did not
happen.
This isn’t predominantly a story about academic science, but it provides a context that’s important to
appreciate f or some current issues in science policy. Over the last thirty years, the research intensity of  the
UK’s university sector has increased, f rom 0.32 per cent of  GDP to 0.48 per cent of  GDP. This ref lects, to
some extent, real- term increases in government science budgets, together with the growing success of
universit ies in raising research f unds f rom non UK-government sources.
The resulting R&D intensity of  the UK HE sector is at the high end of  international comparisons (the
corresponding f igures f or Germany, Japan, Korea and the USA are 0.45 per cent, 0.4 per cent, 0.37 per cent
and 0.36 per cent). But where the UK is very much an outlier is in the proportion of  the country’s research
that takes place in universit ies. This proportion now stands at 26 per cent, which is much higher than
international competitors (again, we can compare with Germany, Japan, Korea and the USA, where the
proportions are 17, 12, 11 and 13 per cent respectively), and much higher now than it has been historically
(in 1981 it was 14 per cent).
So one way of  interpreting the pressure on universit ies to demonstrate the “impact” of  their research,
which is such a prominent part of  the discourse in UK science policy at the moment, is as a symptom of  the
disproportionate importance of  university research in the overall national R&D picture. But the high
proportion of  UK R&D carried out in universit ies is as much a measure of  the weakness of  the government
and corporate applied and strategic research sectors as the strength of  its HE research enterprise. The
worry, of  course, has to be that, given the hollowed-out state of  the business and government R&D
sectors, where in the past the more applied research needed to convert ideas into new products and
services was done, universit ies won’t be able to meet the expectations being placed on them.
To return to the big picture, I’ve seen surprisingly lit t le discussion of  the ef f ects on the UK economy of  this
dramatic and sustained decrease in research intensity. Aside f rom the obvious f act that we’re f our years
into an economic slump with no apparent prospect of  rapid recovery, we know that the UK’s productivity
growth has been unimpressive, and the lack of  new, high tech companies that grow f ast to a large scale is
f requently commented on – where, people ask, is the UK’s Google? We also know that there are urgent
unmet needs that only new innovation can f ulf ill – in healthcare, in clean energy, f or example. Surely now is
the time to examine the outcomes of  the UK’s thirty year experiment in innovation theory.
Finally, I think it ’s worth looking at these statistics again, because they contradict the stories we tell about
ourselves as a country. We think of  our postwar history as characterised by brilliant invention let down by
poor exploitation, whereas the truth is that the UK, in the thirty post-war years, had a substantial and
successf ul applied research and development enterprise. We imagine now that we can make our way in the
world as a “knowledge economy”, based on innovation and brain-power. I know that innovation isn’t always
the same as research and development, but it seems odd that we should think that innovation can be the
specialty of  a nation which is substantially less intensive in research and development than its competitors.
We should worry instead that we’re in danger of  condemning ourselves to being a low innovation, low
productivity, low growth economy.
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